precisely in these kinds of disputes, situations in which what is required is support for the weaker side -if ist cause seems just, in other words: partiality? The tension between 'associative' and dissociative' peace-strategies which was described by Johan Galtung as far back as the 1970s has up to now been interpreted primarily as something relating only to state-based peace-policy. But it is also relevant to civil actors. The theoretical observations and practical examples that follow here are based on reports from training-sessions and workshops conducted with actors from post-communist countries, notably within the framework of a 'support project' for indigenous peace-workers financed in 1995/6 as part of the European Union's 'PHARE/TACIS Democracy Programme'. 1
Democratization as a Transformation of Conflict Culture 2
The democratic upheaval in the eastern part of Europe has radically altered the peace agenda. The introduction of pluralist political systems and the ousting of at least some sections of the old élites by new ascendant groups has meant that the repressive-cum-bureaucratic approach to resolving conflict has been superceded by a 'transitional conflict-culture'. This is characterized, on the one hand, by a strong continuing trend to authoritarian patterns of conflict resolution, particularly on the part of government bodies; on the other hand, by the new institutions embodying parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and economic/political competition which are increasingly necessitating the creation of other mechanisms for balancing interests.
4
In practice, three basic paradigms of conflict culture are observable, and the relative weightings between them provide an indication of the degree of success of the reform process. The first is, in some sense, an extension of the practice of communist party leaderships, whereby differences of interest between various groups exercising influence were kept within manageable bounds through barter, compromise, and the redefinition and accentuation of shared overall interests.
Typical this took the form of, on the one hand admitting the differences, but holding the negotiations behind closed doors, or, on the other hand, the practice of coming to secret accommodations whilst averring unanimity of interests to the outside world. This was the approach used by President Yeltsin in 1995/6, as part of his dual strategy of containing strategic élites within the internal power-apparatus whilst externally projecting the impression of a populist levelling of differences of interests.
The second paradigm consists of open competition and co-operative solutions between various interest-groups, whether in the form of elections or of institutionalized negotiating-processes, including procedures based on the rule of law. The differences are brought into the open and acknowledged as legitimate. The aim is either unequivocal majority-decision or overt agreement as to how the interests of divergent groups are to be reconciled. In many post-communist societies, however, the preconditions for this kind of democratic liberal conflictculture -namely, a stable economic base, established procedures and forums for resolving differences, an acceptance of heterogeneity, plurality, and, above all, the 'rules of the game' -are only at a very rudimentary stage of development. Their further evolution is also rendered more difficult by the sharp polarization between -to put it in simplified terms -the winners and losers of modernization, as emerged, for example, in the Russian presidential elections of 1996 between Yeltsin and Zyuganov.
Apart from the ethnopolitical tensions, it is this opposition between the winners and losers of modernization which represents the greatest challenge to internal peace in the societies undergoing transformation. And yet the civil actors involved in this area -from the trade unions, at their various stages of development, to the newly created commercial and professional associations -are seldom viewed from a peace-work perspective. Neglect of their peacemaking function and potential is possibly one of the reasons why ethnic loyalties and affinities have instead assumed exaggerated importance.
It is in this area -that of ethnopolitical tensions -that the third paradigm of transitional conflict-culture is mostly to be found. Here, differences are often fought out in an especially ruthless and uncompromising way. They point to a long prior history, which not infrequently involves deep historic wounds and claims on both sides. Such differences are at great risk of being resolved by violent means. Why the post-communist world in particular should suffer from this type of conflict is a question that has been subjected to repeated analysis since the changes. 3 Key factors that might be cited here are: the way in which the civil rights movement in many countries outside Russia was linked to the struggle for liberation from Soviet domination; the particular type of "ethnic engineering" within the Soviet Union; the tendency, in times of transition and crisis, to turn to supposedly primeval loyalties and affinities; the calculations of political leaders, who use ethnic membership as a tool in the struggle for power and in economic competition; and of course, last but not least, genuine injustices/the safeguarding of privileges, and the failure to work through the conflict when it ocurred before.
Less attention has been devoted to the question of how far the postcommunist legacy also offers a basis for a constructive conflict-culture in the democratic liberal sense previously mentioned. And yet there are a fair number of examples of ethnopolitical tensions having been successfully resolved -as in the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993, or the bilateral treaties concluded in 1994/5 between the Russian federal government and a number of republics within the Russian Federation. As far as mobilizing civil actors is concerned, the legacy is ambivalent: on the one hand, the high levels of education and training in all the communist countries resulted in the build-up of a large pool of people who are, in principle, qualified for this task; on the other hand, enforced membership of various 'mass organizations' has not exactly increased the motivation to involve oneself voluntarily in efforts to achieve particular political/social ends. The chances of seeing civil-society structures develop are clearly at their best in those places where a broadly based civil rights movement existed before the changes -for example, in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, three countries in which, incidentally, the revolutionary potential of 'civil society' was recognized at an early stage by dissidents.
Civil society movements, albeit often comprising no more than small, poorly resourced non-governmental organizations (NGOs), now exist in all the postcommunist countries. Their development has been fostered to an important extent by support programmes organized by American foundations or the European Union, and also through co-operative projects conducted with Western and international
NGOs. An important role is played here by training and advisory projects aimed at Despite all the commendable contributions it makes towards civilizing conflict cultures, the spread of this kind of Western-initiated training-infrastructure does, it must be said, also suffer from a number of weaknesses. These can be summarized under four heads: 4
• Most of the activities consist of one-off short programmes (lasting one to two weeks), in which mainly Western, English-speaking trainers pass on generalized knowledge, abilities, and skills. It would, however, be better if advanced training were designed to take place over a longer period and conducted in parallel with the work or project concerned; if native experts were involved in the design and implementation of the sessions and local trainers trained for future work; and, last but not least, if the sessions were conducted in the language of the country concerned.
• Developing structures of civil society is a great deal easier in urban, and especially political, centres than on the social periphery. This gap is accentuated by the fact that training events are focused on a circle of individuals with international contacts based in the centres. In choosing the target groups, more account should therefore be taken of geographical range.
• Because of the administrative requirements associated with them, the long period of preparation they require, and the desire to maintain control, support programmes run by Western foundations exercise a de facto preference for projects put forward by Western proposers/project leaders, who do not always fit the bill for the particular region. In addition, it is often easier to obtain funds for training than for projects in which the skills acquired can be put to practical use. One example is the disproportion between the funds raised for training prospective members of 'ethnic conciliation committees'
and those available to NGOs wishing to run reconciliation projects at a local level. A positive counter-example is the decentralized structure of the Soros Foundation, most of whose staff in Eastern Europe are themselves recruited from the national NGO scene.
• After the rhetoric of class war, the 'win-win problem-solving' formulas of conflict regulation, as propagated by many trainers, have fallen on extremely fertile ground. What has often been overshadowed in all this is that, in cases where the power relations in a conflict are asymmetrical and conflict forums have not been sufficiently institutionalized, the mere passing-on of these methods cannot of itself guarantee constructive handling of conflict. Civilizing conflict culture is by no means merely a question of individual capacity to deal with conflict.
The first three of these criticisms have now begun to be addressed in several 
Nurturing and Containing Conflicts
The danger of a domestic conflict escalating to the level of organized violence is particularly great where the distribution of basic opportunities is involved or there is an uneven satisfaction of basic needs. It might be economic advantages and disadvantages or the right to cultural identity or political self-or co-determination that is at issue. Such factors acquire added significance at times of crisis or change, when real or perceived inequalities and injustices are judged to exist between ethnically defined groups. In the eastern part of Europe and in the former Soviet Union, it is usually in majority -minority relationships that this kind of potential for conflict is expressed. Such relationships are particularly explosive when disadvantaged national minorities form a majority of the population locally or regionally, as is the case, for example, with the Albanians in Kosovo, whose basic rights to cultural identity and participation in political decision-making has been denied them.
In such cases, peace work is on the one hand faced with the task of containing intense conflicts in such a way that they can be worked through non-violently; on the other hand, in relationships involving highly asymmetrical and unfair distribution, it may be their job to reinforce or support the weaker side's capacity for conflict. Hence peace work should not be automatically equated with the deescalation of conflicts. Where there is extreme discrimination and handicap, a settlement can generally be achieved only when the conflict has been brought into the open and the stronger party has been confronted with the concerns of the weaker side. In this sense, all the improvements in the protection of minorities which have occurred since 1990 within the framework of the C/OSCE have been due in no small measure to the improved capacity for conflict of the minorities'
representatives and those championing their cause.
However, anyone seeking to reinforce the capacity for conflict of oppressed and disadvantaged ethnic groups by means of peace-based argumentation faces two challenges: first, the seemingly inevitable correlation between the escalation of a conflict and the increased tendency to violence; and second, the possibility of the conflict's becoming further ethnicized. Nevertheless, a number of factors militate in favour of engaging with these dangers in a preventive way. If one works on the premise that, sooner or later, most unfair distributions will come under great pressure to be politicized, then these effects will, in any case, have to be reckoned with. But identifying them in good time could make it easier to link them with nonviolent forms of struggle.
Peace work should therefore be differentiated according to the particular phase of the conflict that has been reached. Or, to put it another way: constructive transformation of a conflict requires different concepts of peaceful intervention depending on the overall conditions and the forms of conflict involved. Four phases should be distinguished-though these should not be viewed as an unvarying, onedimensional succession of clearly demarcated stages. The dynamics of a conflict are determined by a multiplicity of actors at different levels, the individual and not infrequently contradictory developments build up into unforeseen trends. In the case of protracted conflicts there is, in addition, a tendency to interpret reversion to a phase prior to open conflict as success.
Engagement and response in situations of latent and suppressed conflict
In this phase, there is manifest disadvantage to, and discrimination against, a particular group, which my be defined in terms of ethnicity, language or religion. The possibilities which this group has to defend itself against such treatment are minimal, either because of oppression by the majority party or parties, or because of poor internal mobilization. A typical example is the situation of the Roma, who overall, in terms of population, form the largest ethnic minority in Central and Eastern Europe. Although there are now a range of civil actors representing the Roma's interests, they are highly fragmented, rivalry far outweighs any efforts at coalition-building, and their impact within the Roma population remains slight.
Peace work amongst such disadvantaged groups means first and foremost education and training -"conscientization" in Paolo Freire`s sense -and helping them to improve their socio-economic conditions. Only in combination with these things can an increased capacity for organization and solidarity be achieved.
Externally, there has to be a parallel process of public-awareness work, humanrights monitoring, crisis intervention in favour of the minority, and ideally also action to highlight the majority group's own long-term interest in advancing the cause of the minority.
An example of this kind of work is the activity of the Bucharest-based NGO 'Rromani CRISS: The Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies'. This body is geared mainly to developing and supporting social-work projects designed both to bring about some concrete improvement in the situation of the Roma community in Romania and at the same time to enhance their self-awareness/self-confidence, their awareness of their rights, and their sense of collective responsibility. It also documents the situation of the Romanian Roma and works to ensure that they are presented in a non-discriminatory way in the media, to prevent and investigate local pogroms against them, and to secure the introduction of measures that will stabilize multi-ethnic communities.
2.2 Engagement and response in situations of "no violence"/"minimal violence"
In this phase, the weaker parties are in a position to articulate their interests and views; there is a political agenda -e.g. in the form of claims to individual and An indirect approach to social rehabilitation is being pursued by a group of psychologists and educationists from Serbia who have come together to form the 'Group MOST for Cooperation and Mediation of Conflicts', a member-organization of the Belgrade-based 'Center for Anti-war Action'. They have developed school materials and study-programmes encouraging a reflective approach to nationalist tendencies in Serbia's political system and a constructive approach to ethnic differences. Their 'Good Will Classroom' programme, which contains some elements of training in non-violent conflict resolution for schoolchildren, aspires to be applied within the official school-system and therefore lays greater stress on social than on intercultural learning since this is a more acceptable formulation for the state authorities.
Internal and External Conflicts
The previously hotly debated question of whether peace policy and peace work should be aimed primarily at influencing political leaderships or at increasing awareness among the population has now given way to an understanding that both are needed. Typical of the present debate about peaceful intervention in internal, ethnopolitical disputes is a paradigm developed by the American conflict-researcher John Paul Lederach. 5 Lederach distinguishes three hierarchical levels and regards specific kinds of intervention-strategy as being required at each level. The three levels are: the top level leadership, leaders at the middle level, and leaders at the grassroots level. This -undoubtedly important -emphasis on the vertical dimension means that horizontal differentiation fades somewhat from view. This can lead to the impression that the parties to the conflict constitute homogeneous social entities, and that peace work consists mainly in directing the escalation of the conflict into civil channels as it proceeds -depending on your point of view -from the top downwards or from the bottom upwards (or from Lederach´s point of view from the middle up and down). The fact that there are a multiplicity of different actors within the conflict-spectrum, each with their own positions, interests, and preferences in terms of coalitions, fades into the background (Fig. 1) . This is most obvious where there is great dissension within one camp about the way in which a conflict is to be resolved with the other side -as is the case, for example, in Israel, since the Rabin and Perez governments have been backing the idea of an understanding with the PLO. In conditions such as these, the thesis that there will not be a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians until both the Israeli and Palestinian sides are
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reconciled amongst themselves appears a well-founded one.
The notion -widespread in the classical literature on conflict -that escalation will result in greater unity and centralization within each of the affected groups, needs to be modified in view of the complex situation in which societies undergoing transformation find themselves. Although extremist parties and leaderships seek to exploit the polarisation effect, there are a number of countervailing forces. These include, to mention but a few: the different orientations and interests within an ethnic group, which may also polarise increasingly as violence increases; the inter-ethnic enmeshment of economic interests and bureaucratic structures; internal regional competition which, because of the mixed nature of settlement-areas, cannot be reduced to simple ethnic terms; large numbers of people with bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic loyalties, resulting either from origin, mobility, or family ties; and, last but not least, the dynamics of modernization, which generally produces winners and losers in all ethnic groups and secondary parties to the conflict.
The reality of ethnopolitical conflicts therefore involves not only two parties with opposing stances or interests, but also a spectrum of political-cum-social movements lying between the two. A good illustration of this spectrum is provided by the majority-minority conflict between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania.
For simplicity's sake, only three levels are considered here: the partisan, the semipartisan, and the non-partisan. Peace work in this case is a task that presents itself on all three levels -and is by no means the responsibility of non-partisan forces alone.
The most important 'partisan' actors in the conflict are, on the one side, the government, with, behind it, the ex-nomenclatura party-grouping around President
Iliescu, plus various other parties whose programmes have a strongly nationalist accent; on the other side is the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians (DAHR). At bottom, the conflict is about two differing conceptions of the state: on the one hand, that of a unified nation-state in which only the Romanian nation/nationality is acknowledged as having a constituent character, whilst the Hungarian minority represents a 'cohabitee' population; on the other, a multi-ethnic polity in which national minorities are also acknowledged as constituent communities and are accorded the right to personal and regional autonomy.
These conflicting conceptions of the state will not be resolved in the near future. What is more, given the crisis precipitated by transformation, drumming up support by means of nationalist propaganda will continue to be a politically 'worthwhile' activity within the Romanian party-spectrum. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, these actors are confronted with an immediate peace-related task, albeit one that is unevenly distributed between the majority and minority -the task, namely, of acknowledging the legitimate concerns of the other side. Such an acknowledgement is the very first prerequisite if there is to be any chance at all of entering into a constructive dialogue. It requires much more than a tactically motivated, externally demonstrative readiness to talk. It is unlikely to be achieved 
Peace Alliances and their Civil Agents
Peace work aims to transform the conflict itself, and the manner in which it is conducted, in such a way that the danger of (renewed) violence is minimized and, at the same time, solutions are found to the vital concerns of all those involved. In Figure 2 , the contributions of civil actors to the accomplishment of this task are set out according to the phase of the conflict concerned and the degree of partiality of the actors. In order not to overload the diagram, we have highlighted only those roles and tasks in which partisan, semi-partisan, and non-partisan actors display distinct comparative advantages. Overall, it is clear that the parties to the dispute are the decisive actors in the process of a conflict, and that it is therefore right that peace work should be based primarily on their actions and attitudes. However, it is also true that the way in which the conflict is conducted and the nature of its transformation cannot be understood without taking into consideration the semi-partisan forces and movements. Up to now, their role has not been sufficiently recognized and exploited. Lastly, it should be pointed out that impartiality implies two things: on the one hand, it stands for as objective a reminder/promotion of human rights, democracy, justice, and non-violence as possible; on the other hand, it offers an approach to understanding and mediation that is acceptable to all the parties. Both aspects are necessary, even if they can quite easily be in competition with one another in particular cases.
Figure 2: Roles and Tasks of Peace Work in Situations of Conflict

Features of Conflict
In the phase where the conflict is latent and suppressed, the task facing external, non-partisan actors is not primarily one of mediation, but one of support for the underprivileged group. In practice, however, these forms of intervention are not so far removed from one another, since the disadvantaged condition of minorities often only becomes manifest within the framework of engagement in or What opportunities for co-operation are offered to civil actors in post-war situations depends to a large extent on how much of a politically durable solution has really been achieved along with the ceasefire. In many cases, war has led to a deep split in society, one that the political peace-arrangement can only cover over very inadequately. To expect civil actors, in this situation, to assume responsibility, particularly for the revitalization of inter-ethnic links, is to demand far too much. In this phase above all, it is important to set realistic goals and gear oneself to a long process of transition and healing. An important prerequisite if people in a divided society are to be prepared to work for inter-ethnic understanding is that the capacity for peace in each of the ethnic communities be strengthened. Thus, one decisive indicator of Serbian society's capacity for peace will be how it deals with the integration of Serbian refugees and displaced persons from Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina.
Peace work in post-communist societies is inseparable from the creation of a new culture for dealing with political and social conflicts. To achieve this kind of conflict culture, the appropriate democratic and civil-society structures and qualified individuals are required. This should in no way be regarded as a task for marginal idealistic groups. Only when we succeed in making the process of "civilization" a concern both of the parties in dispute and of society as a whole will there be any chance for sustainable peace-building.
